I. Introduction
Since 2002, natural gas exports have brought a large amount of foreign currency revenue to the Government of Myanmar. In the fiscal year 2009-10, 1 natural gas exports amounted to US$2.9 billion, which accounted for 38 per cent of total exports. When converted into the local currency at the prevailing parallel market exchange rate, this revenue amounted to 8.6 per cent of Myanmar's gross domestic product (GDP).
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On the other hand, the chronic fiscal deficit and high inflation due to monetization of the fiscal deficit have been ingrained problems in Myanmar. Monetization of the fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP averaged over 4 per cent in the early 2000s, and inflation ran as high as 58 per cent per annum in 2002-03. With the narrow tax base, the shortage of the fiscal revenue has been persistent.
The large revenue from natural gas exports is expected to consolidate the fiscal balance and contribute to macroeconomic stabilization. However, there have been less pronounced changes in the monetization of the fiscal deficit, and the inflation rate for 2007-08 was as high as 34.5 per cent per annum.
An explanation for the scant impact of gas revenue on macroeconomic stabilization is that, under the dual exchange rate system, the government applies the grossly overvalued official rate for the conversion of foreign currency revenues into the kyat local currency. As of August 2011, the official exchange rate was approximately 5 kyat per U.S. dollar, whereas the prevailing parallel market rate was around 750 kyat per U.S. dollar. Thus, valuating the foreign exchange surplus at the official exchange rate undervalues it by one to one hundred fifty (1/150).
However, if the question is whether applying the market exchange rate resolves the obscure contribution of gas revenue to disinflation, the answer is no. Applying the market exchange rate for the conversion of gas revenue would certainly reduce the fiscal deficit. However, without complementary sterilization, it is accompanied by a proportional increase in the money supply, which in turn exerts inflationary pressure on the price level. With Myanmar's underdeveloped financial system, the monetary authority cannot conduct sterilization operations.
Once cutting the fiscal deficit by devaluation of the official exchange rate, a remaining issue is how to absorb the excess kyat liquidity from the economy. In this regard, it is effective that the central bank sells dollars to the private sector. This policy option is, however, not available since the dual exchange rate system does not permit private sector access to foreign reserves. It is necessary to lift the ban so that the central bank can adjust the kyat liquidity.
Having said that, we must take into consideration the ongoing sharp appreciation of kyat vis-à-vis U.S. dollar in the parallel market. Kyat has appreciated from around 1,300 kyat per U.S. dollar in 2007 to 750 kyat per U.S. dollar in August 2011. Unifying the foreign exchange markets might boost the supply of dollars to the parallel market, which in turn further aggravates the appreciation of kyat and causes damage to the export industries.
The appreciation of kyat itself could be alleviated by relaxing the tight controls on imports. The government has been maintaining such controls which were initially implemented to cope with the severe shortage of foreign exchange in 1997. If the controls on imports were relaxed, it would stimulate the demand for imports and alleviate the appreciation of kyat. Thus, a practical policy recommendation is that the unification of the foreign exchange markets should be coupled with the relaxation of the controls on imports.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II outlines the development of natural gas exports, the fiscal deficit and inflation. Section III argues that the dual exchange rate system limits the capacity of the government to use the gas revenue for containing the excess supply of money. Section IV describes the interrelationship of export revenues, fiscal balance, and the money supply with the accounting identities of the government and the central bank. The section will show that since sterilization is not an available policy option, the excess money supply remains regardless of official exchange rate devaluation. As the policy mix for macroeconomic stabilization, section V proposes the foreign exchange market unification along with the deregulation of controls on imports. Section VI will summarize the analyses of this study and offer some concluding remarks.
II. Impact of Natural Gas Revenue on Fiscal Balance and Inflation

II.1 Export Revenues and Foreign Reserves
Full-scale production and export of natural gas was achieved by 2002, and it has become Myanmar's largest export item. The rise in natural gas exports has been impressive. It was virtually nil in 1998-99, and rose to account for 40 per cent of total exports within ten years in 2007-08. 3 Figure 1 summarizes the indices of Myanmar's balance of payments. The country used to suffer from trade deficits in the 1990s which led the government to opt for strict controls on imports. Natural gas exports have significantly improved the trade balance. Since the public sector monopolizes natural gas exports, the expectation would be that these exports have also contributed to fiscal revenues and improved the fiscal balance.
However, not all of the foreign currency revenue from natural gas exports is reckoned into the fiscal budget due to the repatriation of natural gas revenues to foreign stakeholders. Such outflows have amounted to between 50 and 70 per cent of export revenues in some years. Balance of payments statistics categorize such expenditure as income (debit) in the current account. In fact, income (debit) has soared from US$169 million in 2000 to US$1.3 billion in 2006. As can be seen in Figure 1 , compared with the large surplus in the trade balance, the surplus in the overall balance is not so remarkable.
However that may be, foreign reserve accumulation has been robust. Foreign reserves rose from US$223 million in 2000 to US$1.24 billion in 2006, while the foreign assets of the central bank rose from US$449 million to US$1.75 billion in the same period. 4 The increment of the central bank's net foreign assets in 2007 was US$1.18 billion. This increment of the foreign assets, if converted at the parallel market exchange rate, was equivalent to 6.3 per cent of GDP for fiscal year 2007-08.
II.2 Developments in the Fiscal Balance and Inflation
Although the sharp accumulation of foreign reserve implies the foreign currency budget of the government has achieved a large surplus, the aggregated fiscal balance in nominal terms has remained in deficit. has to some extent improved from around 4 to 5 per cent in the early 2000s to 3 to 4 per cent in the mid-2000s. 5 The improvement in the fiscal balance is less pronounced in comparison with the robust accumulation of foreign reserve. The immediate reason is that the government valuates the foreign currency surplus at the overvalued official exchange rate, which grossly undervalues the gas revenue. Meanwhile, the government has financed most of the fiscal deficit by compelling the central bank to print money.
One can see in the balance sheet of the central bank some traces of the valuation of foreign currency at the official exchange rate. Table 1 summarizes the balance sheet of the central bank. It is due to the valuation of foreign exchange at the overvalued official exchange rate that foreign assets are disproportionately small. If foreign assets are evaluated at the prevailing market exchange rate as in line (B) in Table 1 Turning to the developments in the money supply and inflation, these are summarized in Figure 3 . The growth rate of the currency in circulation has shifted around 20 per cent per annum. This chronically high growth rate of money resulted from the monetization of the fiscal deficit. The balance sheet of the central bank (Table 1) shows that changes in "claims on central government" brought about proportional changes in "reserve money".
Inflation has exhibited an unsteady trend, and no stable relationship can be observed between inflation and money supply in the short-run. Rather, the short-run movement of inflation may be affected by shocks such as the collapse of the rice price in 2000, and the banking crisis 6 and the subsequent economic downturn from 2003. Nonetheless, judging from the experiences of many developing countries summarized by Fischer, Sahay, and Vegh (2002) , the present study considers the excess supply of money as one of the causes for high inflation in the medium-to long-run in Myanmar. In fact, the average annual inflation rate and the average annual growth rate of currency in circulation for the last two decades are close to each other, 28.4 per cent and 22.8 per cent, respectively. Thus, it can be argued that containing the excess money supply is imperative for disinflation in the long-run. This section illustrates that Myanmar's dual exchange rate system has had a negative impact on the usage of natural gas export revenue for macroeconomic stabilization. The government initially implemented the system in order to secure scarce foreign exchange for targeted sectors. The system has functioned to pool the foreign exchange available to the government while saving foreign currency expenditures. Although natural gas exports have significantly improved the government's foreign exchange position, there has not been any conspicuous change in the system.
There are two features in the dual exchange rate system. First, within the public sector the government rations the foreign exchange budget to ministries and State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) at the grossly overvalued official exchange rate. At the same time, public entities having foreign currency revenues are compelled to surrender them to the state budget, 7 and they are not allowed to spend their foreign exchange earnings. The budget for each public entity is divided into a kyat account and a foreign currency account, and two accounts are not interchangeable. Accordingly, even though the public sector as a whole has a surplus in the foreign currency account, SEEs with insufficient rations from the foreign currency budget have no choice but to procure import goods through domestic private importers using the kyat budget. Additional allocations of foreign exchange to such SEEs would save kyat expenditures and reduce the excess money supply.
The second feature is that the dual exchange rate system does not permit private sector access to foreign reserves even for the purpose of current account transactions, not to mention capital account transactions. At the same time, private exporters are not compelled to surrender their foreign exchange to the government at the official exchange rate. While they have to deposit their foreign exchange in foreign currency accounts at state banks where a 10 per cent export tax is levied, there is de facto government recognition that private exporters can dispose of their foreign currency deposits on their own imports or transfer them to others at the competitive parallel market rate. As a result, there is a segmentation of the foreign exchange market between the public and private sectors.
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IV. Irrelevance of Exchange Rate in the Relationship of Export Revenue to Money
Using the accounting identities of the government and the central bank, this section will show that while valuating foreign currency revenue at the parallel market exchange rate would cut the fiscal deficit, it would not add to containing the excess money supply and to disinflation.
As the premise of analysis, three macroeconomic conditions in Myanmar are highlighted. First, under the strict controls on foreign exchange, the foreign exchange markets are segmented between the public and private sectors. For the private sector, they have no access to the foreign exchange reserves of the central bank, while they are not compelled to surrender export revenues at the official exchange rate.
Second, the underdeveloped financial market does not allow the central bank to conduct open market operations. Although the government issues treasury bonds, there is no secondary market. Commercial banks purchase the bulk of the treasury bonds and hold them until the date of maturity. In addition, as shown in the balance sheet of the central bank, loans to the commercial bank are small, and they do not serve as a tool for adjusting the money supply. At present, there is scarcely any scope for open market operations to adjust kyat liquidity in the market.
Third, the government finances the fiscal deficit mostly by printing money. Some portion of the deficit used to be financed with treasury bonds from 1998 through 2000. However, since 2001 the net sales (sales minus discharged) of treasury bonds has been mostly minimal (see Figure 2) as the demand for these assets appears to be saturated.
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The amount of treasury bonds outstanding as of the end of fiscal year 2009 was 939.2 billion kyat, or just 2.8 per cent of GDP. Thus, in the following analysis, it is assumed that money printing is the only means for financing the fiscal deficit.
This analysis also leaves out changes in exchange rate within a period in order to concentrate on the impact that changing the valuation of foreign exchange poses on the money supply. It is assumed that the government can employ either the overvalued official exchange rate or the prevailing parallel market rate. The analysis corresponds to a sort of fixed exchange rate regime.
Starting with the description of the government's fiscal deficit, FD, in terms of kyat, this can be expressed as follows:
where REV and EXS refer to revenues and expenditures in the kyat account, while REV f and EXS f stand for those in the foreign currency account, respectively. ex is the exchange rate of kyat vis-à-vis foreign currency (i.e., U.S. dollar), either the overvalued official exchange rate or the prevailing parallel market rate. A negative value of FD indicates fiscal surplus. Assuming that the foreign currency account is in surplus, i.e., REV f > EXS f, we can see that applying the parallel market rate for conversion of the foreign currency account cuts the fiscal deficit.
Next is a description of the accounting identity of the central bank, expressed as follows:
where the left-hand side of the identity refers to changes in liabilities; M denotes reserve money, and Δ stands for a change in each term. The righthand side refers to changes in assets; R denotes foreign reserves and B local currencydenominated securities. L g and L b are credits (net) to the government and commercial banks. This is a standard accounting identity of the central bank, as in Agenor and Montiel (1999, p. 49) , except that changes in the net worth of the central bank which come from changes in the exchange rate and income from interest on assets are omitted.
With regard to the right-hand side of equation (2), the balance sheet of the central bank (Table 1) shows that the amounts of local currencydenominated securities and credits to commercial banks are zero or quite small relative to other items. Accordingly, it may be appropriate to approximate that ΔB = L b = 0. The sterilization of large export earnings can be described as offsetting the increase in R with reduction in B or L, which leaves M unchanged in equation (2). Since it is approximated that ΔB = ΔL b = 0, the conventional sterilization operation is not an available policy option in Myanmar.
Assuming that the government finances the whole fiscal deficit by printing money, ΔL g = FD. Substituting this and ΔB = ΔL b = 0 into equation (2) and rearranging gives
This implies that changes in money depend entirely on two terms: the fiscal deficit and the changes in foreign reserves. Applying the market exchange rate for valuation of the foreign currency account would reduce FD, which has the effect of containing monetary growth. However, that is offset by the amplified impact of ΔR on money. In other words, using the overvalued official exchange rate for valuation of the foreign currency account has a sterilization effect. While devaluation would cut the fiscal deficit, it eliminates this sterilization effect, and expands the money supply which comes from a valuation change in foreign reserves in terms of kyat local currency. This leaves the growth rate of money unchanged.
The irrelevance of the exchange rate with money growth can be demonstrated more clearly by substituting equation (1) into equation (2') which yields
Under Myanmar's dual exchange rate system, the private sector does not have access to foreign reserves. Changes in foreign reserves come entirely from the government's foreign currency account balance, 10 so that ΔR = (REV f -EXS f ). Substituting this, equation (3) can be reduced to
Equation (4) is significant as it shows that whatever exchange rate is applied for valuation of foreign currency transactions, the money supply is solely determined by the kyat account balance of the government.
V. Policy Reform to Make Use of Natural Gas Revenue for Stabilization
When considering policy reforms to make full use of natural gas revenue for disinflation, reforming the foreign exchange rationing system within the public sector would be relatively easy since adjustments would complete within the public sector. By replacing the procurement of imports using kyat with the procurement using the foreign currency budget, the public sector as a whole could cut kyat expenditures, which would help contain the excess money supply. In terms of equation (3), an increase in foreign currency expenditures does not affect the money supply since ΔR -(REV f -EXS f ) = 0. On the other hand, a cut in kyat expenditures EXS accompanies a reduction in ΔM. Given the current prevailing market exchange rate, replacing one dollar's worth of imports procured from the kyat budget with the procurement from the foreign currency budget would reduce 750 kyat worth of money growth.
Permitting private sector access to foreign reserves would be another significant reform in order to adjust the excess kyat liquidity in the economy. In terms of equation (3), a reduction in ΔR through sales of foreign reserves to the private sector would translate into a proportional reduction in ΔM. By permitting private sector access, it would no longer hold that ΔR = (REV f -EXS f ). A large portion of the natural gas export revenue that is lying idle as foreign reserves at the central bank could be allocated to the private sector. This would absorb kyat liquidity and thereby help achieve disinflation. However, this reform would require thorough consideration of the side effects. Given the ongoing appreciation of kyat, channelling the foreign reserves to the parallel market might further aggravate the appreciation and cause damage to the export industries of the private sector. While the cause of the appreciation is not certain, 11 the remedy is clear: more demand for foreign exchange in the parallel market will alleviate the appreciation of kyat. Relaxing the tight controls on the imports of the private sector is a readily available policy option to combat the appreciation of kyat.
In addition to the ban on the foreign reserves, the private sector has been subject to the strict controls on imports. All private sector imports have required permission from the government. On top of that, since 1998 the private sector was put to a kind of cash budget control on imports. Under this control, sometimes called the ExportFirst Policy, import licences are conditional on the proof of export earnings to cover import bills. Consequently, importing by the private sector has been repressed as shown in Table 2 , which summarizes developments in the trade balance by ownership. The table shows that in the private sector, the growth of importing has been repressed since the early 2000s, and the trade deficit contained.
12 These facts, as a whole, imply that the deregulation of the controls on imports along with the access to foreign reserves would stimulate a sizeable demand for imports and the proportionate demand for foreign exchange.
Regarding the policy mix of the foreign exchange market unification with the relaxation of import controls, a simple simulation of its impacts on the money supply is performed, and the results are presented in Table 3 Fiscal Year simulation here assumes that imports increase by 20 per cent. Similarly, the policy reform might affect the level of the equilibrium exchange rate. It is beyond the scope of this paper to predict the equilibrium exchange rate. Therefore the parallel market rate as of the end of each fiscal year is used for this simple simulation. Looking first at the impact of devaluating the official rate, it would reduce the increase in the money supply that comes from the fiscal deficit. In fact, the fiscal balance would be in surplus in 2007-08, which would actually cut the money supply. On the other hand, due to the change in foreign reserves (ΔR) in terms of kyat, the money supply would expand proportionately. As two changes cancel each other out, devaluation of the official exchange rate per se would not cause any change in the growth rate of the money supply.
Second, by lifting the ban on foreign reserves for the private sector, a part of the foreign reserves would be channelled to the private sector to fill up the trade deficit in this sector. This has the effect to absorb the kyat liquidity from the market in 2007-08. However, when the private sector's trade balance is in surplus as in 2009-10, the private sector might sell foreign exchange to the central bank, which would expand the kyat liquidity in the market.
Third, the impacts of the reform will be in full scale when the increase in the imports of the private sector is taken into account. Here, it is The change in foreign reserves is based on the change in the foreign assets (net) of the central bank's balance sheet denominated in kyat, and converted into U.S. dollar at the official exchange rate. As for changes in loans to the government, a negative value means that the repayment surpasses the disbursement, resulting in a contraction in money supply. The growth rate of money is calculated using the currency in circulated as of the beginning of each period as the denominator. Regarding (1) "Devaluation", the prevailing parallel market rate is used to re-convert the change in foreign assets into kyat. Fiscal balance is calculated based on the re-valued foreign currency revenues. An assumption is maintained that the private sector does not have access to the foreign reserves. Regarding (2) "Devaluation + Foreign Exchange Market Unification", it is assumed that the private sector has access to the foreign reserves. When the trade balance of the private sector is in deficit, they can buy foreign exchange from the reserves. When in surplus, they can sell foreign exchange to the central bank.
Regarding ( assumed that the deregulation will raise the private imports by 20 per cent. With this increase in the imports, more foreign reserves would be channelled to the private sector. Consequently, more kyat liquidity is absorbed from the market. The growth rate of the currency in circulation would be reduced to 0.9 per cent from 27 per cent for 2007-08. Similarly, for 2009-10, the reduction would be by 8.8 percentage points. The simulation confirms the following points. First, devaluation of the official exchange rate per se does not contain the excess money supply. Second, while the unification of the foreign exchange markets would help absorbing the kyat liquidity as far as the private sector is in trade deficit, this impact will be enhanced by stimulating the imports of the private sector through the relaxation of import controls.
The above simulation rules out an appreciationary effect of the foreign exchange market unification on kyat. If such an effect is taken into consideration, one cannot overstate the importance of the relaxation of the strict controls on imports in this policy mix. Needless to say, the appreciation of kyat causes damage to the export industries. In addition, it dampens the absorption of the kyat liquidity: the more the kyat appreciates against foreign currencies, the less the return for selling US$1 from the foreign reserves of the central bank for a given level of imports.
VI. Concluding Remarks
Since 2002, natural gas exports have brought large export revenue to the Government of Myanmar, observers might expect a consolidation of the fiscal balance, easing of the monetization of the fiscal deficit, and disinflation. However, the impact of this revenue on the fiscal balance and inflation has been obscure. One immediate reason is that under the dual exchange rate system, the government valuates export revenue at the grossly overvalued official exchange rate. This undervalues export revenue in terms of the kyat local currency by approximately one to one hundred and fifty (1/150).
Devaluating the official exchange rate would not solve the problem. While it would certainly cut the fiscal deficit sharply, it would lead to a proportional increase in the money supply unless accompanied by sterilization. Given Myanmar's underdeveloped financial market, there is scarcely any room for sterilization operations.
This paper explored measures to use natural gas export revenue for disinflation. It pointed out the dual exchange rate system that aggravates the limited usage of revenue from natural gas exports. Such controls, initially implemented in the 1990s to manage scarce foreign exchange, have worked to pool the foreign exchange available to the government. The private sector is not permitted access to the foreign reserves, and there is segmentation of the foreign exchange market between the allocation system of the public sector and the de facto authorized parallel market. This encourages the accumulation of foreign exchange at the central bank.
Regarding reform measures, by removing the ban on foreign reserves for the private sector, the central bank can sell the foreign reserves to absorb the excess kyat liquidity from the private sector.
However, Myanmar is currently facing the sharp appreciation of kyat in the parallel market: unifying the foreign exchange markets, by fuelling the foreign exchange to the private sector, might cause further appreciation of kyat and damage the export industries. Accordingly, the relaxation of the strict controls on the imports of the private sector is imperative in two regards. First, it will boost the private demand for imports and for foreign exchange. This will then alleviate the appreciation of kyat. Second, when the demand for imports is high, the central bank can absorb more kyat liquidity from the market. Thus, the appropriate policy mix for macroeconomic stabilization is the unification of the foreign exchange markets along with the relaxation of the controls on imports.
